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Abstract
Wittgenstein offers three objections to the idea 
of aesthetics as a branch of psychology: (i) Stat-
istical data about people’s preferences have no 
normative force. (ii) Artistic value is not instru-
mental value, a capacity to produce independ-
ently identifiable – and scientifically measurable 
– psychological effects. (iii) While psychological 
investigations may bring to light the causes of 
aesthetic preferences, they fail to provide reasons 
for them. According to Wittgenstein, aesthetic 
explanations (unlike scientific explanations) are 
poignant synoptic representations of aspects of a 
work, and the criterion of success of an aesthetic 
Resumen
Durante un breve período de tiempo en 1912, Witt-
genstein intentó aplicar la psicología experimental 
a la estética: la idea de la estética como una rama de 
la psicología era inadecuada. Juicios estéticos ver-
daderos o falsos resultan ridículos. Para comparar 
y clasificar las obras, se necesitaría alguna medida 
externa (el placer), pero el instrumentalismo hedo-
nista también es rechazado por Wittgenstein. Tal 
investigación puede sin duda ser valiosa, pero no 
es lo que interesa en la estética o la crítica de arte. 
Mientras que Hume, Kant y muchos otros estaban 
ansiosos por liberar lo más posible los juicios esté-
ticos de las contingencias de su contexto cultural, 
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explanation is that it satisfies the addressee. He 
repeatedly remarked that they resemble philo-
sophical explanations, which also try to dispel 
puzzlement or confusion. The difference, how-
ever, is that whereas in philosophy we deal with 
general conceptual problems, aesthetic explana-
tions typically concern individual responses to 
particular works of art.
Wittgenstein, por el contrario, insta a que sean de 
suma importancia. Había una sorprendente simili-
tud entre la estética y la filosofía: una investigación 
es ocasionada por una inquietud o perplejidad, o al 
menos una sensación de falta de comprensión, que 
necesita ser curada o resuelta. Pero la estética como 
crítica de arte no puede ser subsumida bajo la filo-
sofía, sino solo parecerse a ella.
Keywords
Wittgenstein, aesthetic judgements, psychology, 
philosophy.
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1. Wittgenstein’s objections to scientific aesthetics
For a short period of time in 1912, Wittgenstein tried to apply experimental psychology 
to aesthetics. With his friend David Pinsent he experimented on the perception of musical 
rhythm, trying to ascertain under what circumstances a regular sequence of beats, such as 
of a metronome, was heard as accentuated1. «Useless experiments» he called them later in a 
1933 lecture (ML 363), and continued to explain what is wrong with the idea of aesthetics as 
a branch of psychology. The same lines of criticism recur in his 1938 lectures on aesthetics. 
The following are Wittgenstein’s three main objections.
(i) Scientific aesthetics is typically motivated by a striving for objective standards of 
aesthetic quality. Dissatisfied with the permanent disagreement among our subjective pref-
erences, people hope that somehow scientific research might find some general principles 
to prove some aesthetics judgements true and others false2. Such an idea of aesthetics as a 
science telling us what’s beautiful, what we should like, Wittgenstein thought ‘almost too 
ridiculous for words’ (LC 11). 
How should psychology be able to establish such standards of taste? In its crudest form, 
the psychological approach to aesthetics simply investigates what the majority of people like. 
Thus, Gustav Theodor Fechner (1876), one of the pioneers of psychological aesthetics stud-
ied people’s aesthetic responses to different kinds of rectangles. His experiments seemed to 
show that the most beautiful rectangles, those that the majority of people found pleasing, 
were those constructed according to the Golden Section, a ratio already known and used in 
antiquity.3 However, more recent studies failed to confirm Fechner’s results. Holger Höge4 
found that preference ranking varied considerably according to the experimental method 
used (e.g. whether subjects were asked to draw rectangles or to sort them), but either way, 
1. B. McGuinness, Wittgenstein: A Life. Young Luwig (1889-1921), London: Duckworth, 1988, 127-128.
2. A. P. Shimamura, “Toward a Science of Aesthetics Issues and ideas”, in: Shimamura & Palmer (eds.): 
Aesthetic Science: Connecting Minds, Brains, and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 4.
3. The ratio of the Golden Section is: a (longer side) : b (shorter side) = (a + b) : a ≈ 1.61803.
4. Holger Höge, “The golden section hypothesis — its last funeral”, Empirical Studies of Arts 15, 1997, 
233–255.
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no clear preference for the Golden Section could be found.5 But even if there was a majority 
preference for rectangles with the Golden Section ratio, why should that impress those who 
prefer their rectangles to have different ratios?
Moving from simple geometry to art, the American psychologist Colin Martindale 
found that his undergraduates quite liked academic painters such as William-Adolphe 
Bouguereau and Lawrence Alma-Tadema, and concluded that these painters’  low esteem in 
the art world must be down to snobbery and prejudice6. In other words, Martindale sugges-
ted that popular vote rather than expert critique was to be the criterion of aesthetic quality. 
By the same token, it would appear that kitschy puppies and sunsets on porcelain plates are 
likely to be esteemed as the finest paintings, while soppy soap operas may be acknowledged 
to be the most admirable dramatic art.
Again, the obvious response to such a view is this: why should it matter to me how 
many of Martindale’s students, or the general public, enjoy Bouguereau? Obviously I don’t 
need psychologists to tell me what I myself like, nor should I be so weak-minded as to make 
my liking dependent on the agreement of the majority. And if I don’t like Bouguereau, what 
does it profit me to be told that, say, 73% of the population do?  
Hume suggested that instead of following the majority we derive a standard of taste 
from the verdict of ideally perceptive and well-educated people. That is half sensible, half 
mistaken. If you are interested in a certain art form you are indeed well advised to listen 
to a discerning connoisseur of that kind of art, but it is mistaken to expect such a critic to 
prove to you that you should care for that art form or genre, with its implicit conventions, 
in the first place. Sancho’s kinsman (in Hume’s story) can convince us that the wine from 
a certain hogshead tastes slightly of leather, but he cannot convince us to care for wine, 
rather than beer, or to accept the conventional standards of the oenological community 
regarding a hint of leather.
(ii) In order to compare and rank works of very different kinds, or even of different art 
forms one would need some external measure, which is typically taken to be the pleasure (or 
some other positive psychological effect) produced by an aesthetic experience. This hedonist 
instrumentalism, implicit in many attempts to put aesthetics on a psychological footing, is 
also rejected by Wittgenstein. Artistic value is not instrumental value, a capacity to produce 
independently identifiable – and scientifically measurable – psychological effects. «The work 
5. In fact, in another study of ‘experimental rectangle aesthetics’, Chris McManus found that ‘population 
preferences were small in comparison with individual variation’ (McManus 1980, 522). In other words, 
even for very simple geometric shapes different people have strikingly different aesthetic preferences. But if 
there is no agreement at the most elementary geometric level, it is hard to see how such experiments could 
provide us with any guide to the assessment of more complicated aesthetic arrangements, especially as such 
arrangements in painting are hardly ever a matter of pure geometry, but tend to involve reference to things 
beyond the canvas. Thus, Flip Phillips et al. had to admit that ‘applying a metric to beauty’ was seriously 
impeded by, what they called, ‘connotative properties of artwork’ (Phillips et al. 2010, 269).
6. C. Martindale, “Bouguereau is Back” in Proceedings from the XV Congress of the International Associa-
tion of Empirical Aesthetics Rome, September 21–24, 1998. Rome, La Sapienza, 146.
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of art does not seek to convey something else, just itself» (CV 67). Unlike a tin opener, a car or 
an aspirin, a work of art is not to be regarded as a means to an end. Rather, it is appreciated 
for its own sake.7
(iii) Psychologists do not only investigate what most people like, but also which char-
acteristics cause them to like or dislike something. Such research can undoubtedly be worth-
while, but it is not what interests us in aesthetics or art criticism. As Arnold Isenberg puts it: 
when we ask [somebody] as a critic why he likes the object Y we want him to give us some reason 
to like it too and are not concerned with the causes of what we may so far regard as his bad taste.8 
Aesthetic discourse is concerned with reasons, rather than causes (LC 21); with jus-
tification relative to the internal standards of an artistic practice, rather than with a genetic 
account of what caused us to have those standards in the first place (ML 360) and with ex-
planations that (re-)describe and clarify our impressions (ML 356, 361; LC 20, 29).9
2. Wittgenstein’s conception of aesthetics
At the centre of Wittgenstein’s account of aesthetics lies the notion of a ‘cultured taste’  (LC 
8). This need not be a taste in art. One of Wittgenstein’s key examples is sartorial: ‘a person 
who knows a lot about suits’  and is able to tell a tailor exactly which cut, length and mate-
rial he thinks right (LC 5-7). A «cultured taste», or serious aesthetic appreciation, has three 
characteristics:
(i) It is informed by an uncommonly detailed knowledge of its subject matter, a keen 
awareness of particulars and nuances that others might overlook (LC 7). 
(ii) It is based on (though not fully determined by) a loose set of conventional rules (LC 5).
(iii) It manifests a certain consistency of judgement (LC 6).
Whereas Hume, Kant, and many others were anxious to free aesthetic judgements as 
much as possible from the contingencies of their cultural context, Wittgenstein, on the con-
trary, urges that these contingencies are of paramount importance. Social conventions, fash-
ions, ideological background and temperamental inclinations should not be regarded as dis-
7. For further discussion, see Schroeder 2017a, 616-18.
8. A. Isenberg, “Critical Communication”, (1949) repr. in his Aesthetics and the Theory of Criticism, Chi-
cago, The University of Chicago Press, 1973, 158.
9. For some further discussion of Wittgenstein’s objections to scientific aesthetics, see Schroeder 2017b.
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torting influences, but as the necessary underpinnings of any serious aesthetic appreciation. 
What gives substance and significance to our appreciation of art, what makes it more than 
a superficial liking, is the way it is anchored in a specific culture, a way of life defined by its 
customs and manners, its moral values, its religious and political beliefs. Hence the ideal of 
a timelessly valid aesthetic judgement, cut loose from all its cultural moorings, doesn’t make 
any sense. In the same way, the proper appreciation of a bespoke suit is inseparable from 
the sensitivities of a culture in which suits are worn and seen as a manifestation of social re-
spectability, and where small differences in material, colour and fit are noticed with approval 
or disapproval. To somebody from a different culture with very different sartorial customs 
a European three-piece suit may look exotically charming or beautiful, but such a person 
would be unable seriously to appreciate it (cf. LC 8-9).
Needless to say that our societies are not homogenous, but harbour a great variety of 
life styles, moral, political, and religious views, and so there co-exist many different cultured 
tastes, which one may explore and cultivate according to one’s personal preferences and in-
clinations. Aesthetics is concerned with questions of right and wrong, better or worse (LC 
3) — but only relative to the rules and standards of given cultured taste, which one is free to 
adopt or to ignore.
More specifically, Wittgenstein describes aesthetics as concerned with aesthetic explan-
ations of either an educational or a clarificatory nature. 
«Educational aesthetic explanations» are to give others a better understanding of a work 
of art, guiding them to look at it in the right way, to see what is essential. Common examples 
are interpretations of works of literature which do not normally go beyond the contents of 
the work.10 Rather, they summarize and re-describe those contents in an illuminating way by 
relating them to the work’s major themes11. 
«Clarificatory aesthetic explanations» are attempts to remove some sort of puzzlement 
about one’s aesthetic impressions. Perhaps the simplest kind of case is that something, say, a 
musical phrase, strikes you as a familiar gesture or movement, reminds you of something — 
but you cannot say of what (LC 19). You may then be satisfied by lighting on the comparison 
with the move from a premise to a conclusion (LC 37). Sometimes, however, it is exactly the 
experienced aptness of such a comparison or metaphor that seems to call out for an explana-
tion. If, for example, Tchaikovsky’s Sixth Symphony strikes me as pretentious, I may wonder 
how it can do so: how it can make an impression of promising more than it delivers12 (cf. 
Isenberg 1952). A satisfactory explanation may then point to certain phrases whose dramatic 
character does not fit well into their context: does not follow well, according to the rules of 
the classical style, from what goes before and is not satisfactorily developed in what follows. 
10. The widespread idea that literary interpretations should result in some sort of new message applies 
only in rather exceptional cases, such as allegories or romans à clef (cf. Schroeder 2001).
11. P. Lamarque & S.H. Olsen, Truth, Fiction, and Literature, Oxford, 1994, 259-261.
12. A. Isenberg, “Pretentious as an Aesthetic Predicate” (1952), in his Aesthetics and the Theory of Criti-
cism, Chicago, 1973, 172-83.
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Wittgenstein emphasises two characteristics of aesthetic explanations (of either kind): 
First, they are further descriptions or poignant synoptic representations of aspects of a work, 
often making use of telling comparisons (ML 361; LC 20, 29). Secondly, the criterion of suc-
cess of an aesthetic explanation is that it satisfies the addressee (by making them see the point 
of something or by removing a prior puzzlement) (ML 357, 367; LC 18-19).
3. Aesthetics & Philosophy 
Wittgenstein remarked repeatedly that there was a striking similarity between aesthetics and 
philosophy. Moore reports that in Wittgenstein’s 1933 lectures, «he said that the same sort of 
“reasons” [as in Aesthetics] were given, not only in Ethics, but also in Philosophy» (M 106). 
And in 1937 Wittgenstein was struck by:
The queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation (perhaps especially in mathema-
tics) and one in aesthetics. (E.g. what is bad about this garment, how it should be, etc..) [CV 29]
In 1949 he singled out aesthetic and conceptual questions as the only ones that ‘really 
grip him’ (CV 91).
Some similarities between Wittgenstein’s accounts of aesthetics and philosophy are in-
deed obvious. 
(i) Aesthetic questions arise on the background of a developed taste that essentially 
involves rules (whose importance is emphasised in the 1938 lectures: LC 5-7); likewise, the 
subject matter of philosophy, i.e. conceptual analysis, is the rule-governed system of our 
language.
(ii) In both areas, an investigation is occasioned by a «disquiet or puzzlement», or at 
least a felt lack of understanding, which need to be cured or resolved. Our efforts should al-
ways be focused on specific problems. Wittgenstein has no time for systematic theory build-
ing, independent of a particular explanatory need.
(iii) In both areas, Wittgenstein emphasises that the temptation to give causal explana-
tions must be resisted. They would by-pass our conceptual or aesthetic problems.
(iv) Rather, in these areas, what we need are further descriptions, reminders of what 
we already know, synoptic representations (PI §122), and illuminating comparisons (RPP I 
§1000). No new discoveries are to be expected, rather a new arrangement of familiar things 
is to change the way we look at them (PI §126; LC 28).
The philosopher says «Look at things like this!»… [CV 70]
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All that Aesthetics does is to draw your attention to things: e.g. This is a climax. It places things 
side by side: e.g. this prepares the way for that. [ML 356]
One may indeed wonder if this is just a similarity or if it is not simply a matter of aes-
thetics being a branch of philosophy. «Are» aesthetic questions not conceptual questions? 
Not exactly. Wittgenstein’s lectures on aesthetics are of course a contribution to philosophical 
aesthetics, but the aesthetic questions and explanations he describes in those lectures do not 
have the generality of philosophy; they are about specific aesthetic experiences: personal re-
sponses to particular works of art. Aesthetic discourse has an essential indexicality, which has 
been well explained in Isenberg’s perceptive essay Critical Communication13. The reasons we 
can give for aesthetic judgments can never be entirely separated from the particularity of the 
work in question. When, for example, praise of El Greco’s The Burial of Count Orgaz is sup-
ported by reference to ‘a steeply rising and falling curve’ made by the contours of the figures 
depicted that specific quality cannot be captured by the words alone, but must be perceived in 
the painting. For, obviously, not every steeply rising and falling curve is as impressive as this 
one. The critic’s meaning must, so to speak, be filled in by the act of perception14. 
Many problems in philosophical aesthetics are generalisations of problems individuals 
have encountered vis-à-vis some particular works of art, for example, the search for an ex-
planation of the emotional expressiveness of instrumental music or the question of why we 
are not upset by the representation of sorrowful or terrible events on stage. And arguably it is 
exactly that generalisation — abstracting from particular works and individual sensitivities 
— that makes such philosophical questions unanswerable. What explains «your» responses 
to the kinds of music and tragedy you appreciate will probably not explain «my» somewhat 
different responses to somewhat different works (see Schroeder 2017a, 623-6).
So, aesthetics as art criticism (and discussion of other specific aesthetic phenomena) can-
not be subsumed under philosophy, but only resemble it. However, what seems to speak against 
the likening of philosophical to aesthetic explanations is that whereas, on Wittgenstein’s ac-
count, the latter are correct when they satisfy us — they are essentially subjective —, one wants 
to protest that in analytic philosophy: right is «not» simply whatever seems right to me.
The way to resolve this tension is to consider that philosophy, as conceived by Wittgen-
stein, has two parts. Usually, when we encounter a philosophical problem (in an academic 
book or article) it comes together with an attempted answer: a philosophical theory. We rarely 
discuss philosophical problems afresh and in isolation; we are almost always concerned with 
the assessment of various existing answers to a given problem.
These existing answers or philosophical theories are, according to Wittgenstein, just 
subtle forms of nonsense (PI §119). Hence, philosophical investigation is to a large extent 
concerned with showing the flaws and inconsistencies in some given philosophical picture or 
theory. Thus, in the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein occupies himself at some length 
13. A. Isenberg, “Critical Communication”, (1949) repr. in his Aesthetics and the Theory of Criticism, op. 
cit., 162-163.
14. Op. cit. 162-163.
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with the dismantling of his own earlier philosophical theory about language, and later in the 
book he attacks a certain very natural and very common conception of psychological words 
(which is, roughly speaking, Cartesian dualism). This critical and destructive part of philo-
sophy (PI §118) is markedly different from an investigation in aesthetics, though it would 
resemble the critical discussion of a theory in philosophical aesthetics. It consists in finding 
flaws that are not just a matter of personal dissatisfaction, but breaches of logic and patent 
empirical falsehood.
However, once this negative task has been done, we get back to the original problem 
and try to resolve it in a way that eschews the temptation to concoct another nonsensical 
philosophical theory. Instead we are to look for synoptic representations of the relevant 
aspects of our grammar; or for some persuasive comparisons with other phenomena that 
help to make the puzzling one appear less puzzling. This is the part of philosophy that re-
sembles aesthetics.
For instance, Wittgenstein shows convincingly that linguistic meaning cannot be ex-
plained as being due to mental acts of meaning something accompanying speech. That theory 
out of the way, there appears to remain a puzzle, namely what to make of the phenomenon of 
experiencing the meaning of a word in an instant. When Wittgenstein grapples with this phe-
nomenon in the late 40s, the «queer resemblance» with an aesthetic investigation is fairly ob-
vious. He is, for the most part, not concerned with the demolition of any philosophical theor-
ies, but trying to dispel an abiding sense of puzzlement. And what he is casting around for are 
comparisons that would put the phenomenon of experiences of meaning into a perspective 
where it no longer appears baffling. — Here is a perplexing phenomenon (encountered when 
thinking about conceptual relations) that is very much like an aesthetic experience we don’t 
fully understand; and the attempts to dissolve the perplexity are markedly similar to what 
cures an aesthetic problem.
Consider two classical philosophical problems that Wittgenstein touched upon, but 
that have been given a more systematic treatment and solution along Wittgensteinian lines by 
Peter Strawson, namely: the problem of induction and the problem of free will. 
How can it be rational to accept a conclusion that is not entailed by the premises; that 
for all one knows may turn out to be false? As Strawson explains, the paradoxical appear-
ance that it is ultimately irrational to trust induction is due to an unreasonable fixation with 
deduction as the paradigm of rationality and hence an inclination to see induction as only a 
defective variant of deduction (Strawson 1952, 250). He poignantly compares the question 
whether induction is rational to the question ‘Is the law legal?’, for —: 
to ask whether it is reasonable to place reliance on inductive procedure is like asking whether 
it is reasonable to proportion the degree of one’s convictions to the strength of the evidence. 
Doing this is what being reasonable means in such a context. [Strawson 1952, 257]
To my mind, Strawson’s discussion is an exemplary piece of philosophical analysis that 
conclusively dissolves the Humean puzzlement about induction. And yet not all readers seem 
to be entirely satisfied by it. In some of them the Humean puzzlement stubbornly resists 
Strawson’s explanations (e.g., Stroud 1977, 64-7; Dancy 1985, 203-5). 
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 Second example: it has been a perennial source of philosophical puzzlement how our 
concepts of freedom and responsibility can remain applicable in the light of causal determin-
ism. And again, Peter Strawson has provided a perceptive and convincing analysis to dissolve 
the puzzle in his famous essay Freedom and Resentment (1962).15 Yet again, it appears that 
not everybody’s disquiet about determinism could be laid to rest by Strawson’s analysis. The 
quasi hypnotic power of the idea that our actions have causal antecedents beyond our con-
trol is nicely illustrated by the way Galen Strawson’s The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility 
(1994) shows this philosopher to be quite impervious to the force of his father’s arguments.
  Such familiar examples of continuing philosophical disagreement as to whether a 
proposed conceptual analysis can be regarded as the solution to a philosophical problem lend 
further support to Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy as interestingly similar to aesthetics. It 
is fairly obvious that our aesthetic impressions can differ widely, and with them our sense of 
what aspects of our experiences need explaining and what then we regard as a satisfactory 
explanation. It is less obvious — and perhaps more frustrating — that in philosophy too 
our disagreements may not just be due to remediable mistakes and confusions, but also to 
insuperable differences in our subjective responses: in what we find puzzling and in need of 
explanation and in what we regard as a solution to a philosophical problem.
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